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American divergence. Lost decades and Emancipation collapse in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1820-1870.1 
 
 
Abstract 
The period 1820-1870, commonly referred to as the ‘lost decades’, is widely regarded as the 
key moment in the opening of the gap between Latin America and the Unites States. We test this 
statement with a new export series and some tentative estimates of GDP trends. The overall 
performance of Latin American countries was quite good, although not outstanding. Mexico 
was hit by a foreign policy crisis, but the only real losers were the British and French colonies 
in the Caribbean. The emancipation of slaves caused a collapse in their exports, favoring other 
tropical countries, including Cuba and Brazil. Further South, independent countries such as 
Argentine and Chile increased their share of world trade. Overall, most of the divergence 
during the period 1820-1870 in the Americas was between tropical countries rather than 
between Latin America and North America.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Mexican president, Porfirio Diaz, once said 'Poor Mexico, so far from God and so 
close to the United States'.  In economic history, this statement holds true for the whole 
continent South of the Rio Grande. Its economic performance is routinely compared 
with the American one and the results are not flattering. On the eve of World War One, 
the average GDP per capita of Latin America was less than a third of the American one 
(Maddison 2014).  Yet, in 1500 Mexico and Peru had undoubtedly been richer than the 
United States. The timing of this ‘reversal of fortunes’ is still uncertain. Acemoglu et al 
(2002 p.1258) conclude “that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and it was linked to industrialization”, but this 
dating is not unanimously shared. The recent estimates by Allen et al (2012) and Arroyo 
Abad et al (2012, Figure 1) feature a sizeable gap in real wages between North and 
South America since the late 16th century and push the start of the divergence further 
back in time: the United States was much richer than Peru throughout the 18th century, 
                                                                 
1 Funded by European Research Council  Advanced Research. Grant Number: n.230484, years 2009–13 
and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Grant Number: ECO2011-25713 and ECO2014-
58784-P. 
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almost as rich as Mexico around 1720 and about a quarter richer around 1780. On the 
contrary, according to the avowedly optimistic view of Dobado (2015), levels of 
consumption in Latin America were close to North American ones (and higher than 
most European ones) in the early 19th century. By definition, the larger the gap in GDP 
per capita in 1800, the better the 19th century performance relative to the United States. 
   This conventional wisdom is still largely based on anecdotal evidence and on a 
simple inference from the very troubled political history of the continent. In fact, in 
spite of noteworthy recent progress, hard data on Latin American countries are still in 
short supply.  Data on GDP per capita are available for only some countries, sometimes 
only for a few benchmark years, and many of them are only guesstimates. Most authors 
have used exports per capita as a proxy for GDP, under the assumption that in the early 
19th century exports to the industrializing core were the main or sole source of growth 
for the periphery (Bates et al 2007, Prados de la Escosura 2009, Bulmer Thomas 2003 
and 2012, Bertola and Ocampo 2014). In this paper, we follow this tradition, relying on 
our new estimate of world trade since 1800 (Federico and Tena 2016). We are able to 
make three new specific contributions. First, we consider all polities in the Americas, 
including the Caribbean, which have so far only been the subject of a parallel (and 
similarly pessimistic) literature. Second, we frame the performance of exports from 
American countries in the growth of world trade during the first globalization (Federico 
and Tena 2017 a) 
). Third, we estimate, albeit crudely, trends in openness, which we use to produce 
(tentative) series of GDP for all American polities.   
    After a survey of the literature on the ‘lost decades’ (Section Two), we present 
the available data on GDP (Section Three) and trade (Section Four). The latter data 
suggest a division of South American polities into three groups, which we deal with in 
more detail in the next Sections. Section Five focuses on the performance of the major 
temperate independent countries, which ranged from the decent (Mexico) to the 
outstanding but highly fragile (Peru). Section Six outlines the massive changes in the 
world market for tropical products, which featured the rise of Spanish colonies (Cuba 
and Puerto Rico) and Brazil, as well as of non-American competitors, and the decline of 
the once-domineering British and French colonies. In Section Seven we discuss how 
much this latter depended on the effects of slave emancipation. Section Eight presents 
our estimates of openness and GDP and Section Nine concludes. 
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2. The literature on the lost decades: Independence and Emancipation 
The pessimistic view suggests three different, but surely not mutually exclusive, 
mechanisms to explain the poor performance of the newly independent Latin American 
countries. 
 First, political fragmentation caused South America to lose all the scale 
advantages Spanish colonial empire had offered (Bates et al 2007). The common 
currency and legal system could have helped the development of a single market 
(Irigoin 2003), and indeed there is evidence of a modest convergence of prices within 
some viceroyalties, but trade between them was still limited (Gallo and Newland 2004). 
In contrast, independence brought national currencies, with different (and often 
unsound) monetary policies and, in most cases, also protectionism. All the new states 
increased duties to raise revenue, and high protection became a persistent feature of 
Latin American history (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004).2 
Second, the Spanish (and, to some extent, Portuguese) rule had left extractive 
institutions. Spain extracted huge revenues from the empire, the colonies were 
forbidden from trading with foreign countries and trade with Spain was heavily 
regulated, the colonial society was highly hierarchical, the Church enjoyed a privileged 
status, and property rights on land were poorly defined and insecure (Coatsworth 1997, 
2006, 2008 Mahoney 2010). After independence, trade was liberalized, but other 
extractive institutions remained, and the power of the élite grew, unconstrained by the 
Spanish crown (Coatsworth 1998). In a series of celebrated papers, Engermann and 
Sokoloff (1997, 2002, 2005 and 2011) have argued that land concentration and the 
ensuing concentration of local power reduced investments in public goods, such as 
education and infrastructure, which were critical for long-run sustained growth.  
The most common explanation of the divergence, however, points to the 
dysfunctional politics of the newly independent countries: “In the half century following 
independence the presence of widespread political instability and violence distinguished much 
of Latin America, especially Spanish America, from the United States” (North et al. 2000, 
p.28). They were plagued by constant political turmoil, which often erupted in civil and 
foreign wars. Spain made steady efforts to reconquer its colonies until well into the 
                                                                 
2 Duties on British cotton goods from the principal Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile , 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela)  were as high as 68% in 1846 and halved to 32% in 
1863 (Tena-Junguito et al. 2012). 
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1830s and other European powers enforced blockades and military interventions to 
defend their markets and their geostrategic influence. Its location and size made Mexico 
particularly vulnerable. It lost Texas in 1836 and then half of its remaining territory in 
1846-1848 to the United States and, on top of this, was twice invaded by the French, in 
the so-called Pastry War of 1838-1839 and again in 1861-1867.  But many other 
countries were involved in foreign wars involving post-independence borders: Centeno 
(1997 Tab 1 and 2) lists 10 conflicts for Argentina, 6 for Brazil, 5 for Uruguay and 
Mexico, 4 for Chile and 3 for Colombia.  Moreover, domestic political violence is 
deemed largely a colonial legacy: social groups and regions within each state strove for 
power in order to defend or expand their privileges (North et al 2000).  Wars imposed a 
heavy toll in human lives and discouraged foreign and domestic investment, harming 
growth. Furthermore, they were expensive: between 1822 and 1860, military 
expenditures averaged between 50 to 77 percent of total budgets in Latin America 
(Centeno 1997, Tab.2 and Halperin 2008/1969 pp.136-138). The situation began to 
improve in the 1860s. In most countries, civil wars had ended and liberal political forces 
had taken office, abolishing most of the “ancient regime” rules affecting land and 
internal customs but also implementing modern commercial and civil codes (Stein and 
Stein 1970).  
This pessimistic view has not gone unchallenged. Grafe and Irigoin (2006, 2008) 
and Irigoin (2015) have questioned the traditional view of the Spanish empire as extractive. Dye 
(2006) observes that the institutional framework of post-independence countries was complex 
and not uniformly bleak. Chile combined a prosperous economy with a stable government after 
Independence (see Rector 1986 and Salazar and Pinto 2003).  Argentina experienced a soft 
institutional transition as the free trade interests in Buenos Aires easily overcame the opposition 
from landowners from the inland states (Amaral 1993). In a more general vein, Llopis and 
Marichal (2009, p.12) point out that Latin American countries outperformed their 
former colonial masters, Spain and Portugal in the early 19th century. The most 
consistent critic of the pessimistic view is Prados de la Escosura (Prados de la Escosura 
and Amaral 1993, Prados de la Escosura 2009). He admits that the end of transfers to 
Spain did not compensate for the losses from market fragmentation and from the post-
independence political turmoil, but he argues that on balance the new countries gained 
thanks to the new opportunities for exports to Europe after the liberalization of trade. 
Other authors are more cautious, suggesting that the positive effect of exports was not 
large enough to translate into sustained growth on a continental scale and that growth 
6 
 
was concentrated in the coastal regions (Bulmer-Thomas 2003), which had easier access 
to foreign markets (Bertola and Ocampo 2014 pp. 75-79).   
    This literature ignores the Caribbean, which is the subject of a parallel and 
similarly pessimistic narrative (Bulmer Thomas 2012). Their poor performance cannot 
be explained by political turmoil, as all islands but Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican 
Republic) remained European colonies throughout the period. However, most scholars 
point to the abolition of slavery in the 1830s and 1840s as a major shock that these 
economies did not overcome until the end of the 19th century. The traditional 
interpretation, as defined by Williams (1944), considered abolition an unavoidable 
consequence of the irreversible economic decline of the plantation system, but this view 
is no longer accepted. Drescher (1977, 1999) has argued that the plantation system was 
as efficient in the Caribbean as in the Southern United States (Fogel and Engerman 
1973, Fogel 1989). Abolition was ‘economic suicide’, an ethically motivated political 
decision, which disrupted the system and caused a collapse in production and exports.    
 
3. Measuring the performance of the Americas: GDP and wages 
Table 1 reports the data on GDP per capita at constant prices for American polities in 
1800, 1820 and 1870, and the corresponding rates of change according to Maddison and 
the two main comparative studies on Latin American polities during the ‘lost decades.’  
 
Table 1 
GDP per capita and growth (1990 PPP $) in the Americas 
 
1800 1820 1870 rate 1820 1870 rate 1820 1870 rate
Canada 904 1695 1.26
USA 1296 1361 2445 1.17 1257 2445 1.33
Argentina 931 998 1468 0.77 1249 1837 0.77 998 1468 0.77
Brazil 683 683 713 0.09 652 680 0.08 597 694 0.3
Chile 626 605 1290 1.51 607 1295 1.52 710 1320 1.24
Colombia 591 533 676 0.48 423 539 0.48 607 676 0.22
Cuba 503 644 927 0.73 583 838 0.73 695 1065 0.85
Mexico 836 627 651 0.08 695 720 0.07 733 651 -0.24
Uruguay 1088 1165 2181 1.25 1004 1880 1.25
Venezuela 415 375 570 0.84 347 529 0.84 460 570 0.43
Jamaica 701 530 -0.56
639 794 0.43
667 674 0.02
636 549 -0.3
628 776 0.42 648 813 0.45 684 772 0.24
World 712 884 0.43
Sources:  Maddison (2014) ;  Prados de la Escosura (2009 Tab. 6); Bertola and Ocampo (2014)Tab A.1 and 2.4
Prados de la Escosura Bertola and Ocampo
L. America
15 L. America
21 Caribbean
8 core countries
Maddison
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The initial GDP figures tally well with the view by Allen et al (2012) and 
Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2012) on the size of income gaps at the end of the 
colonial period.3 Subsequent changes, in spite of the differences among estimates, are 
broadly consistent with the conventional wisdom. They do show a substantial variance 
in rates among countries. Chile and Uruguay matched the growth of the United States, 
but the performance of the two largest economies of the continent was disappointing, to 
say the least. Mexican income stagnated according to Cardenas (1997) and Salvucci 
(1993) and declined according to Coatsworth (1978, 2005). The rates for the Caribbean, 
if cumulated over fifty years, imply a fall of 15% in GDP for the whole area and of 30% 
in Jamaica alone.   
  Recent work suggests that this pessimistic view of the economic performance of 
the Americas should be re-considered. Lindert and Williamson (2016) estimate that the 
GDP per capita of the United States was higher and grew (slightly) faster before the 
Civil War than suggested by the standard estimates (Table 1).4 GDP per capita declined 
over the whole period 1820-1870 in Venezuela (De Corso), but grew quite fast in Brazil 
(Tombolo 2013), Chile (Braun et al. 2009) and Peru (Seminario 2015). 5 Summing up, 
we have series of GDP per capita at constant prices for five polities only, which 
accounted for 65% of the total population of the Americas (but only 40% of the 
population of Latin America). 6   
    Some authors have suggested using real wages as a proxy for GDP. This 
approach is correct only under strict conditions (Broadberry et al 2015) and, regardless, 
the results for Mexico City (Challú and Gomez-Galvariato 2015) and Lima (Arroyo 
Abad, 2014) are inconclusive. Real wages of unskilled workers underwent serious 
fluctuations without any long-term trend. In both countries, wages hit a trough during 
                                                                 
3Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2014) suggest a slightly lower figure for Mexico (813 dollars) and put 
forward an estimate for Peru (665 dollars) in 1800.  
4 They estimate the rate of change as 1.4% in 1800-1860 (including the recovery from the ravages of the 
Independence war) -0.3% in 1860-1870 and 1.16% over the whole period 1800-1870. The figures for 
GDP in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (1930 in 1800, 3250 in 1860 and 3100 in 1870) can be obtained by 
multiplying the British data by the authors’ estimates of the difference between the two countries.  
5 For the rates, see Appendix Table 1. GDP per capita may have also increased in Bolivia from 1846 to 
1890 (Herranz Loncan and Peres-Caijas 2016 App.1). 
6 Bulmer Thomas (2012 On line Appendix) reports series of GDP per capita at current prices for three 
additional countries, Argentina, Colombia and Cuba. 
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the independence war, recovered in the 1830s and 1840s and fell sharply in the 1850s 
and 1860s, but the size of the fluctuation is much greater in Lima than in Mexico City. 
 
4. Measuring the performance of the Americas: exports 
According to our estimates, during the ‘lost decades’, total exports of the 44 American 
policies grew quite fast, but less than ‘world’ trade.7  Exports from the Americas 
increased by 4.4 times (a yearly rate of 3.35%) but world trade increased by 6.8 times (a 
rate of 4.10%).8 The share of exports from the Americas (at current prices) fluctuated 
slightly below 30% until the mid1830s, declined very slowly in the 1840s and 1850s, 
collapsed to about 20% during the American Civil War and remained low throughout 
the 1870s.      
    
   These movements in the aggregate share is the net sum of widely different 
trends, as Figure 1 shows. 
 
Figure 1 
Shares on ‘world’ trade, current prices 
 
   
  Sources: Federico-Tena (2016) 
                                                                 
7 We estimate ‘world’ trade from 1823 onwards as the sum of exports of 63 polities (44 American and 18 
additional ones), accounting for about four fifths of total world exports in 1850 and in 1870 (Federico 
and Tena 2016).  
8 Unless otherwise stated, here we compute rates of change as w=- β/ψ, where β and ψ are coefficients 
from a regression (Razzaque et al 2007) Δ Ln Wt=α+β TIME+ψ lnWt-1+ φ ln Δ Ln W t-1 +u. We estimate 
cumulate change over a period of n years as Tot=[exp(w)*n]-1 
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 Shares of the independent countries and of the Other North America (mostly 
Canada) remained broadly constant in the long run, with a very modest decline in the 
1850s and 1860s. The United States managed to increase its share of world trade until 
the Civil War, thanks to the almost parallel increase of exports of tobacco and cotton 
from the South and wheat flour and cotton manufactures from the North. 9 Thus, the 
decline of the aggregate share on ‘world’ trade reflects mostly the collapse of exports 
from the European colonies in the 1830s and early 1840s (partially compensated by the 
rise of exports from the United States) and of exports from the Southern USA during the 
Civil War and its aftermath. 10  
  
    The American performance appears even worse if we consider that total 
population increased, according to our estimates, from 3.7% to 6.4% of the world total 
between 1820 and 1870 (Federico and Tena 2017 a)).  The growth rate of exports per 
capita in the Americas was barely above a third of the rate of the rest of the ‘world’ 
(1.4% vs. 3.6%). However, as Figure 2 shows, not all polities performed poorly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
9 Tobacco and cotton accounted for about a half of American exports (and for 6-8% of world trade) from 
the 1820s to the eve of the Civil  war, with a peak of almost two thirds in the 1830s (Historical Statistics 
USA 2007 series Ee 571, Ee 573, Ee575-576). 
10  The decline of the share of Southern United States accounts for 140% of the decline from 1858-60 to 
1868-1870. Exports from Northern United States (defined as total exports less cotton and tobacco) 
increased from 5.6% to 6.7% of world trade. 
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Figure 2 
Rates of growth, export per capita, 1820-1870 
 
 
Sources: Table 1 Appendix.  
 
 
 In Figure 2 we introduce a more refined classification, distinguishing ‘Western 
European’ colonies (British, French, Danish and Swedish territories, all located in the 
Caribbean with the exception of the Falklands) from Spanish ones (i.e. Cuba and Puerto 
Rico), which we include in ‘Other Tropical’ alongside independent tropical countries 
(most notably Brazil). Only seven polities out of 44, all independent countries, 
outperformed the rest of world, and only one, a tropical one (Nicaragua) by more than 
one percentage point. On the other side of the range, exports per capita declined in 
fifteen polities and all of them but two (the Dominican Republic and Haiti) were 
Western or North European colonies (see Appendix Table 2). 
 These comparisons may be deemed unfair, as they do not account for the initial 
level of exports per capita. Ceteris paribus, it is much easier to increase exports per 
capita when starting from a low level rather than from a high one. Before the French 
Revolution, the Americas exported proportionally more than any other extra-European 
continent to Europe: according to De Vries (2010), sugar exports were four times larger 
than total Asian exports, and all American exports, including other tropical products and 
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silver from Mexico and Peru, might have been ten times larger. Despite political shocks, 
in the 1820s the gap between the Americas and the rest of the world, and among 
different groups of polities within the Americas, were still very wide (see Table 2). 11  
 
Table 2 
Exports per capita in 1823-1825 (1913 $) 
Americas 5.25 North America 7.30 USA 5.73 
Asia 0.27 
Independent 
2.75 Mexico 1.92 
Other 
Europe 1.93 
Independent 
tropical 
3.32 Brazil 3.48 
Oceania 1.79* Spanish colonies 7.22 Cuba 7.77 
World 1.36 
Western European 
colonies 
26.81 Jamaica 29.40 
*1826-1828. Source: Exports Federico and Tena (2016) and population Federico and Tena (2017b)) 
 
Only two Central American independent tropical countries and Ecuador 
exported less than the average of the rest of the world (0.93 in 1913 dollars), while the 
average exports per capita of ‘Western European’ colonies in the 1820s exceeded 
exports per capita of 93 out of 130 world polities in 1913. The gap between the Western 
European colonies and the rest of the continent (and a fortiori the rest of the world) 
shrank in the next half century but still remained substantial. At the end of the ‘lost 
decades’ their exports per capita were ‘only’ 80% higher than the average of the rest of 
the continent, rather than five times higher as in the early 1820s. 12 
 
5. The lost decades after independence?  Mexico and the rest 
 
Mexico deserves special attention because it was the most populous South American 
country until the 1860s and because its political history during the ‘lost decades’ was 
exceedingly troubled, featuring external wars, military coups and popular uprisings (see 
Bates et al 2007 and Dobado et al 2008). Colonial Mexico exported mostly silver, 
supplying about two thirds of world total around the turn of the 18th century (Dobado-
                                                                 
11 In Table 2, we further distinguish within ‘other tropical’ between (Spanish) colonies and independent 
countries  
12 See export per capita average levels for individual American polities in Appendix Table 2. 
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Marrero 2001, p.285). Mining had been hit hard during the independence war and 
production in the 1820s was about half the pre-war level (Cardenas 1997 Tab.1). Output 
recovered very slowly in the 1830s and in the first half of the 1840s, but then the 
recovery accelerated in the second half of the decade, with an overall yearly growth rate 
of 2.2% in the period 1821-1850 (Sánchez-Santiró 2009 p.81). Indeed, our series of 
exports per capita (Figure 3), based on the new estimates by Kuntz and Tena (2017), 
show a long-term upward trend, with an acceleration in the 1850s and the early 1860s 
and deep crises during wars.  
 
Figure 3 
Exports per capita (1913$):  representative independent countries  
 
  
 Sources: Federico-Tena (2016) 
 
Furthermore, trends in exports per capita accord with the population growth 
estimates by McCaa (1993), the real wage series by Challu and Gomez-Alvariato 
(2014), and the evidence on the resilience of subsistence agriculture, which employed 
the vast majority of the population (Tutino 1986, Cardenas 1997). Indeed, exports 
collapsed in parallel with and probably as a consequence of external crises. Thus, our 
results support the view by Sánchez-Santiró (2009), who has recently argued that, at 
least until the second half of the 1850s, domestic disturbances were mostly urban and 
short-lived events and thus did not affect the rest of the economy.  
Figure 3 plots exports per capita for the three other largest temperate 
independent countries. They all were success stories, despite rather different post-
independence political histories. North et al (2000) single out Chile, jointly with Brazil, 
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as a haven of political stability and, indeed, the country attained one of the highest 
growth rates of GDP per capita (cf. Section Three). Chile had already been well 
integrated into the metropolitan and world market during the colonial period and 
exploited well the opportunities of the globalizing post-Waterloo world (Gellman 2009). 
Its export-led growth was fueled by the discoveries of silver veins and of accessible 
copper deposits. Copper output rose from 1,500 tons before independence to around 
18,000 tons in the 1850s (Llorca-Jaña 2012).  From the early 1820s to 1870, total 
exports from Chile increased by 14 times, growing from 0.23% to 0.68% of world trade  
   Peru and Argentina did not enjoy the same degree of political stability. North et 
al (2000 p.45) highlight Peru, alongside Mexico, as the ‘archetypal’ cases of 
dysfunctional institutions. The collapse of Argentine exports in 1826-1828, 1838-1840 
and 1845-1848 (Figure 3) coincided with blockades of Buenos Ayres port (respectively 
by the Brazilian, the French the Anglo-French). Yet, both countries succeeded in 
increasing their share of world exports during the ‘lost decades’, respectively from 
1.12% to over 1.79% and from 0.21% to 0.46%. Argentina exported salted meat, hides 
and wool, and the boom of exports reflects the expansion of cattle raising on the land 
seized from the natives. The acreage for pasture tripled and the cattle population 
expanded from 1 million to 6 million in addition to 38 million sheep (Gellman 2009, 
p.36).  Colonial Peru was similar to Colonial Mexico: it exported mostly silver to Spain 
and developed an internal market around the mining cities (Contreras and Cueto 2004). 
As in Mexico, the production of silver plummeted during the independence war (Arroyo 
Abad 2014). By 1840, it was back to pre-war levels, but afterwards exports stagnated 
and silver was substituted by guano and other minor commodities such as saltpeter and 
wool after 1850 (Hunt 1984). However, this boom was short-lived, as the deposits of 
guano were limited and its demand was hit very hard by the competition of chemical 
fertilizers (Federico 2005). 
  It would be possible to continue this analysis considering other countries, but the 
message is clear. Most independent (non-tropical) countries managed to exploit the 
growth of world demand during the first globalization and exports were the main driver 
of their economic growth. Domestic political turmoil and poor institutions did not 
necessarily prevent success on the world market, while external wars were destructive 
for short periods.   
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6. The Americas and the competition on the market for tropical products 
In the previous Section, we have dealt with polities separately as each of them was a 
small player on the world market for its staple, with the possible exception of silver.  
This approach is not suitable for the polities located between the two Tropics. These 
polities exported almost exclusively tropical products (Table 4 a) and, until 1830, they 
dominated the world market (Table 4 b). The ‘Western European’ colonies supplied 
60% of sugar (and Brazil and the Spanish colonies a further 30%), Brazil, the Spanish 
colonies, the ‘Western European’  colonies and the independent American countries 
(including Haiti) a fifth of coffee consumption each, and the Southern United States two 
thirds of world cotton.   
 
Table 3 
The market for tropical goods 
 Brazil British 
Colonies 
in 
America 
French 
colonies 
in 
America 
Cuba 
and 
Puerto 
Rico 
Other 
tropical 
countries 
USA Other Non 
tropical 
producers 
Share of tropical products on total domestic exports  
1830 78.4% 100.0% 100.0% 92.7%  62.4%  
1850 84.1% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8%  78.2%  
1870 85.9% 100.0% 100.0% 97.9%  78.6%  
1913 90.3% 100.0% 100.0% 94.1%  36.4%  
Share of polity on world trade of tropical goods  
1830 8.8% 17.7% 5.1% 8.4% 26.3% 17.6% 16.2% 
1850 12.2% 5.2% 1.9% 9.8% 28.9% 29.4% 12.4% 
1870 9.9% 3.9% 1.5% 10.4% 33.5% 28.5% 12.4% 
1913 12.4% 1.5% 0.5% 7.5% 39.4% 29.1% 9.7% 
Source Federico and Tena (forthcoming)  
 
 
Trends in exports per capita confirm the stark contrast between the collapse of the 
European colonies and the rise of other suppliers (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4 
Exports per capita (1913$): American tropical polities 
 
    Sources: Federico-Tena (2016) 
 
 
The rise of exports per capita from the Southern United States reflects the four-
fold growth of exports of cotton, from 280 million pounds in 1830 to 1,424 million in 
1860 and the doubling of tobacco exports, from 82 to 164 million pounds (Historical 
Statistics USA 2006 series Ee 570 and Ee572). This success was thus independent from 
the crisis of the European tropical colonies, which in 1830 did not export tobacco and 
accounted for only 2% of the world cotton trade. The exports per capita from the 
Southern United States collapsed from 20.8 dollars to 1.1-1.6 dollars during the Civil 
War, and recovered only partially after the war. By 1870, it still supplied 56% of world 
cotton (vs. 73% in 1850) and 46% of tobacco (vs. 49% in 1850) but its share of world 
trade was down to 3.6% (vs. 6.1% twenty years before).  
  Cuba and Puerto Rico performed quite well. Their exports per capita increased 
more than fivefold and their combined share of ‘world’ trade fluctuated around 1.5%, 
with peaks of around 1.7%. Sugar and its derivatives accounted for 55% of total Cuban 
exports in 1820 and for over 80% fifty years later, while exports of coffee disappeared 
(Federico and Tena forthcoming). The output of sugar increased by 14 times (Deer 
1949), due mostly to substantial investments funded by Spanish and local capital (Dye 
1998, Santamaria and Garcia 2004 pp. 177-8). The key innovation was the 
centralization of processing in large steam-powered mills (denominated ‘Centrals’) that 
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crushed the cane of several plantations, and the construction of sugar plantation 
railways to carry the highly perishable cane from the fields to the factory. This strategy 
paid off, as the Spanish colonies increased their share of world sugar exports from 15% 
in 1830 to 38% in 1870 (Federico and Tena forthcoming). Our constant market share 
analysis shows that this success would have augmented their share of total world 
exports by half a percentage point, had it not been more than compensated by a decline 
in the share of sugar in world trade.   
   Brazil followed a different developmental path, which featured a change in 
specialization and a shift in the location of export production from Bahia and Pernambuco in the North-East to Rio, São Paulo and Minas Gerais in the South-East (Leff 1973 and 1997, Klein and Vidal Luna 2010). In the early 1820s, sugar accounted for about a quarter of total exports, coffee for about a fifth and cotton for a 
sixth (Absell and Tena 2016).  In the next half a century, cotton exports remained constant, with a spike in the 1860s and early 1870s, sugar exports increased by 2.5 times, peaking in the mid-1850s, and coffee exports soared, growing by almost twenty times. Coffee overtook sugar as the main Brazilian staple around 1830, and grew to half or more of all exports from the 1850s onwards. The Southern states had a favorable climate, a considerable endowment of fertile land and a 'vast 
informal credit market' (Frank 2005), but the growth of coffee production was initially 
hampered by poor infrastructure and high transportation costs (Klein 1990). However, 
the bottleneck was eased by the construction of railways in the 1860s, meeting the 
requests of the coffee planters (Summerhill 2005 and 2006).  This development path was initially very successful: Brazil’s exports per capita increased fourfold from the early twenties to the 1850´s and the country almost doubled its share of world exports, from 2.2% in the late 1820s to (almost) 4% thirty years later.  The gains in 
the markets for tropical products account for all the growth in the share of Brazil in 
world trade in those years (Federico and Tena forthcoming). From 1850 to 1870, Brazil 
succeeded in maintaining its share of world market of tropical products, but lost 
competitiveness in non-tropical exports (minerals) and was affected by changes in the 
composition of world trade. Thus, at the end of the ‘lost decades’ its share of the world 
market was down to about 2.8%.  
Despite their differences, these three success-stories share a common trait: the 
persistence of slavery until the end of the period. In the early 1860s, there were 3.95 
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million slaves in the United States, up from 1.55 in 1820, 1.5 million in Brazil, up from 
1.1 in 1819, and around 400,000 in Cuba and Puerto Rico (Historical Statistics 2007, 
series ??, Klein and Vidal Luna 2010 p.76, Klein 1986 Tab 1 and 2). The growth in the 
Brazilian slave workforce may seem modest relative to the surge in exports, but slaves 
were increasingly concentrated in the booming Southern states. They accounted for 
around a third of all Brazilian slaves in 1819 (around 0.4 million) and for about half in 
1872 (over 0.7 million).  As is well known, slavery was abolished in the United States 
in 1865, and this marked the start of its demise in the whole Western Hemisphere. It 
was abolished in Puerto Rico in 1873, and the Spanish and Brazilian governments 
approved the so-called free-womb laws (the Moret Law, 1870 and the Rio Branco Law 
in 1871) that freed all children of slaves (Schmidt-Nowara 2010).  Import of slaves had 
been outlawed in Puerto Rico since 1844, in Brazil since 1850 (after a bombardment by 
the Royal Navy) and in Cuba since 1866, and thus these laws implied a gradual 
withering of slavery. Slavery was formally abolished in Cuba in 1886 and in Brazil two 
years later, but the system was already collapsing due to slave desertion (Klein and 
Vidal Luna 2010).  By then, Brazil was substituting slaves with European immigrants 
and its share on the world market of tropical products (i.e. coffee) increased to 12.4% in 
1890.  
 
   
           7. The collapse of Caribbean exports and slave emancipation  
Exports from the ‘Western European’ colonies grew quite fast in the 1820s, to about 45 
million (1913) dollars in 1828-1830, equivalent to 6.9% of ‘world’ trade. In the next 
twenty years, total exports halved to 22 million, and their share collapsed to about 2%. 
About two thirds of this collapse is explained by the loss of their market share in 
tropical products (Federico and Tena forthcoming ). Exports did recover in the 
following decades: in 1870 they were about one half higher than in the mid-1850s and 
in 1913 about 1.6 times higher. Yet, their share on the ‘world’ market continued to 
slide, declining to 1.1% and 0.5%, respectively. If we consider exports per capita, the 
picture is pretty much the same – a total fall by 55%, from 27.8 dollars in 1830 to 12.4 
in 1840 (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5 
Exports per capita (1913$): Western European colonies  
 
          Sources: Federico-Tena (2016) 
   
       
The key for this disappointing performance is the export of sugar, which accounted for 
three quarters of total exports from the British colonies and seven eights from the 
French ones.  Their output of sugar barely grew in the period, while world production 
increased by 3.5 times (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6 
Output of sugar in British and French colonies and world output share (1870=100) 
 
 
 Source: British and French colonies Deerr 1949 
World Galloway 1989 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British and French colonies from Deerr 1949; World from Moreno Fraginals (1978) 
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The massive decline in production in the British colonies in the late 1830s and in 
France in the early 1850s coincides with the abolition of slavery. Slaves in Haiti had 
successfully revolted in 1791, gaining freedom and independence in 1804, but no other 
revolt ever succeeded. Slavery in the British colonies was abolished on January 1st 
1834, but former slaves were obliged to remain on the plantations (for a shortened 
working day) and were eventually freed only in 1838 (Green 1976, Fogel 1989 pp.218-
233, Drescher 2010). France abolished slavery only in 1848, after the fall of Louis 
Philippe (Fogel 1989 p. 234, Stauffer 2010) and the Netherlands followed in 1863, after 
two decades of debate (Den Heijer 2010).   
Emancipation was bound to negatively affect the output of plantations, as it 
increased labor costs and disrupted the organization of production. The former slaves 
had to be paid wages above the pre-abolition cost of food and lodging and were less 
dependable than slaves. Unsurprisingly, exports of all ‘Western European’ colonies, except the tiny Leeward Island, hit the trough of the whole period 1820-1870 two to three years after emancipation (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
The effects of emancipation on exports of European Tropical colonies 
 
British French Dutch Western 
 
Colonies Colonies Colonies Tropical 
Before abolition (three year average) 1837 1847 1861 
 All time minimum (three year average) 1841 1850 1866 1840 
Percentage changes 
    All period (1830-1870) -24.2 12.2 -67.3 -24.9 
1830 to  all-time minimum -51.5 -42.5 -69.3 -48.7 
Before/after  abolition  -33.6 -27.0 -28.2 
 Before/after  abolition (unweighted average) -32.9(0.42) -49.2(0.45) -19.2(0.85)  
Contribution of Abolition  47.5 50.1 17.4 
 Source: Federico and Tena (2016) 
  
  The post-emancipation shock cut exports by about a third on average, although 
the variance in the size of the shock was huge, as shown by the coefficient of variation 
of the unweighted averages (in brackets). In contrast with the conventional wisdom, this 
fall, although massive, accounted only for about a half of the total decline in exports 
from ‘Western European’ colonies (Table 4, row ‘contribution of abolition’). As said, 
their total exports had peaked in 1830-1831 and in many cases the stagnation or decline 
had started much earlier – i.e. before any plausible threat of abolition. For instance, the 
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sugar production of Jamaica hit its all-time peak in 1806, fell by a tenth until 1820 and 
by a further 18% to 1830. Unlike the Southern United States, the sugar islands of the 
Caribbean (as well as Brazil) required a steady flow of new slaves from Africa and thus 
the plantation system was hampered by the prohibition of the slave trade.     After emancipation, the sugar islands faced two possible solutions, either to keep 
their specialization in sugar and increase productivity, as in Cuba, or, like Brazil, to 
change specialization towards a product, like coffee, which could not be produced in technologically advanced consuming countries and thus was less subjected to protection and competition.  Jamaica did a bit of both towards the end of the century, investing in modern sugar processing plants and increasing the production of bananas (Eisner 1961), but it was too little, too late.  In fact, the 
recovery from the shock of abolition was very slow. Exports from the ‘Western 
European colonies did not even exceed permanently the level of the 1830s before 1870. 
The loss of market shares in their traditional export products (i.e. mainly sugar) 
accounts for two thirds of the decline in overall share of exports from British colonies in 
1830-1850 and for two fifths in 1830-1870 (Federico and Tena forthcoming).  To be 
sure, the recovery of exports from the British and French colonies was hampered by the loss of the preferential treatment they enjoyed in the United Kingdom and France and by the rise of new competitors.  In the United Kingdom, the differential duty for 
colonial sugar was progressively reduced, down to zero in 1851 (Green 1976 p. 229-
230). This was part of the final push towards the liberalization of the British market 
(Curtin 1954), but it might have also been suggested by the rise of real prices of 
Jamaican sugar under the preferential regime.13 Either way, the recovery of other 
tropical American producers after the abolition of slavery was decidedly faster.14     
                                                                 
13  The nominal price of Jamaican sugar in London to 1850 Gayer-Rostow -Schartz (1953) and afterwards 
from Sauerbeck (1986), deflated with wholesale price indexes from the same sources (Mitchell 1988) 
pp.723-727). The US real prices are computed linking three different series of prices for sugar (Historical 
Statistics 2006 series Cc218, CC220 and Cc 220) and deflating with index prices Cc113 and Cc124.  
14  Exports from Cuba fell by 42% from 1883 to 1890 but rose at a very fast rate (7.18% per annum) from 
1890 to 1913. Exports from the Southern United States fell by 44% from 1859 to 1867 and grew at 3.87% 
thereafter. The post-abolition shock was somewhat smaller but still sizeable in Brazil (10% from 1884 to 
1889) but the growth of exports was equally fast (3.49% from 1889 to 1913). 
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 8. Exports and GDP  As hinted in the introduction, many scholars assume exports to have been the main or sole source of growth for Latin American countries during the ‘lost decades’. Of course, this by no means implies a perfect correspondence between rates of growth of exports and the rate of growth of GDP.  Any difference would show in export/GDP ratios, which can be computed for the United States and seven 
South American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru (since 1826) 
and Venezuela (since 1830) at current prices (Figure 7). 15   
 
 
Figure 7 
Export/GDP ratios, available countries 
Sources: See text 
 
Differences in levels among countries are not surprising, given the well-known 
inverse relation between openness and size.  The very high level of openness for Brazil 
might be surprising, but in those years the country consisted of tiny pockets of export-
oriented areas, with little or no domestic trade. In Brazil, as well as in Venezuela and in 
the United States, export and GDP grew in parallel, while their ratio increased 
significantly in the other four countries. 16 
                                                                 
15 We compute them as the ratio of our export series to GDP at current prices from sources l isted in 
Section Three, plus series for Argentina, Colombia and Cuba (only at current prices) from Bulmer 
Thomas 2012 Appendix on l ive tab A.3.4.  
16 The rates of change in the ratio are 2% for Argentina (significant at 1%), 1% for Chile (significant at 5%) 
0.9% for Colombia (significant at 5%), 0.7% for Cuba (significant at 1%) and  2.1% for Peru  (significant at 
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   Unfortunately, we do not have data on GDP for the other 36 polities, which 
accounted for between a third and two fifths of the population of the Americas. Thus, 
we estimate openness by using the available data on exports per capita. As a first step, 
we show that the two variables are strongly correlated by running a fixed effect panel 
regression for the eight countries from Figure 7. 
 
Ln αit=c+ β lnXPCit     1)  
 where αi is openness at current prices and XPCi exports per capita at constant prices.17 
The coefficient β is 0.46 with USA and 0.47 without it, both significant at 1%.  We 
could use this co-efficient to estimate openness for missing countries, but, given the 
different trends in openness, we prefer to use country-specific coefficients, which we 
obtain from the panel regression  
αit = c+FEi+ βi XPCit      2) 
We estimate yearly export/GDP ratios for the j-th missing country as  
 αjt = c+FEi+ βi XPCjt     3) 
selecting the fixed effects and coefficient for the i-th country which seems more similar 
for location, factor endowment and specialization to the j-th polity.18 By definition, 
given openness and exports, we can compute GDP per capita at constant prices as  
GDPPCjt = (XTjt/αjt)/POPjt.  4)   
  We check our results (or Baseline Estimate) by computing yearly series of GDP 
for missing countries as the sum of exports and domestic value added (Alternative 
estimates).19 We assume this latter to have grown as much as population, starting from  
VAjt0 = (Xjt0/αj t0)-Xj t0       5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1%). The rates are not significant for Brazil, Venezuela and the United States, where openness increased 
before the Civil  War (0.6% p.a., significant at 10%).  
17 We prefer to use data at current prices on the right/hand side and at constant prices in the left hand 
side to reduce the amount of spurious correlation. 
18 We use the coefficients for Cuba to estimate openness of “tropical countries” group, except for the 
Central American countries that we use Colombia; Argentina for the Falkland islands; United States for 
Other North America; Peru for Paraguay, Mexico, Bolivia and Ecuador.  
19 This estimate is broadly inspired by the work by Prados de la Escosura (2012) on African income. 
However, he extrapolates backwards the GDP from its end-year (1950) and he divides the economy into 
a traditional sector (value added growing as much as population) and a modern one (value added 
growing as much as exports). He assumes this latter to be twice in size the export sector in 1950, and 
obtains the Value Added of the traditional sector as a residual. 
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  We aggregate the series of openness by polities in groups as in Figure 2, 
weighting with shares on population, and we plot them separately for our ‘baseline’ 
estimates (Figure 8a) or with the ‘alternative’ one (Figure 8 b) – in both cases using 
actual series whenever possible. 
 
Figure 8 
Openness ratios, 1820-1870 
 
(B)‘baseline estimate’                                                (A) ‘alternative  estimate’ 
Sources: see text 
 
In the long run, openness remained constant in the United States (Figure 7), 
Other North America and other tropical countries. In the Western European colonies, it 
remained constant according to the baseline GDP estimate, while it declined according 
to the alternative one. The export/GDP ratio unambiguously grew only in the (non-
tropical) independent polities. We report the long-run rates of growth in GDP per capita 
for the same groups in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Rates of growth of GDP per capita, 1820-1870 
 
Average Population weighted 
 
Baseline Alternative Baseline Alternative 
United States 1.17 1.17 1.17       1.17 
Other North America -0.06 -0.10 0.40 0.02 
Western European colonies 0.18 -0.22 -0.38 -0.17 
Other tropical 0.79 1.29 0.94 1.24 
Independent 1.32 0.76 1.35 0.71 
     All polities 0.60 0.32 1.12 0.95 
significant only 0.39 0.42 1.07 0.90 
    
Sources: see text 
 
The estimates, although admittedly tentative, do not support the pessimistic view 
of the performance of the Latin American economies, even in the more prudent 
‘alternative’ estimate, which implies no productivity growth in the traditional sector.20 
Only the British and French colonies experienced difficult times, according to the 
previous section, mostly because of the abolition of slavery. Figure 9 shows the rates of 
change of GDP per capita, in both definitions, alongside rates for exports (the same as 
in Figure 2), which are by construction higher.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
20 Furthermore, the alternative estimate implies zero income elasticity for non-tradables – i.e. that all  
the increase in export income was spent in imported goods (with a balanced trade).  
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Figure 9 
Rates of growth of Exports and GDP per capita 1820-1870  
 
Notes: "Export pc": Exports per capita at constant prices, the same as Figure 2.  "B.GDPpc":  Baseline 
estimation of Exports per capita at constant prices; "A.GDPpc":  Alternative estimation of Exports per 
capita at constant prices. Method of estimation see text. 
Sources: List of countries Appendix Table 1. 
 
    
 According to our estimates, GDP per capita declined in 18 out of 44 polities and 11 
of them were the Western European colonies. On the other side of the range, GDP per 
capita grew faster than in the United States in fifteen polities according to the baseline 
estimate and in eight according to the alternative one, five of them included in other 
tropical polities.  
9 Conclusions  
In this paper, we have argued that the conventional wisdom regarding the poor 
performance of the Latin American polities during the ‘lost decades’ must be revised 
because it papers over huge differences among them.  The export performance of the 
former British and French colonies in the Caribbean, which never recovered from slave 
emancipation, was indeed very poor, and probably caused a decline in GDP per capita. 
Other countries performed much better, including Mexico, despite the impact of war. 
Brazil and the remaining Spanish colonies, as well as tropical countries on other 
continents, benefitted from the collapse of the Tropical European colonies but 
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succeeded in increasing exports by investing in sugar production and diversifying in 
less competitive markets. Further South, other independent countries exploited 
successfully the growth of world demand for temperate and mining products. We 
exploit our export series to tentatively estimate GDP for all polities when missing and, 
unsurprisingly, the results confirm our view – even in the most conservative 
‘alternative’ estimate.  Most Latin American countries, including the largest ones by 
population, performed fairly well, as they could exploit very abundant natural resources. 
These decades were not so lost, after all.  
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APPENDIX 
    
  
 Table 1 
    The Americas (by countries and groups) rates of growth of  export and GDP per capita (estimated) (a)  
  
 1820-1870 (1913$) 
    Label Countries Group Number Export pc  B.GDPpc  A.GDPpc 
II ARGENTINA Iberian Indpendent 38 3,68 1,74 1,74 
TWE BAHAMAS Tropical Western European 23 0,62 -0,10 0,59 
TWE BARBADOS Tropical Western European 20 0,46 0,35 0,10 
TWE BERMUDA Tropical Western European 35 3,23 2,51 0,41 
II BOLIVIA Iberian Indpendent 40 4,43 2,75 0,91 
OT BRASIL Other Tropical 32 2,02 0,72 0,72 
TWE BRITISH GUAYANA Tropical Western European 36 3,26 1,53 0,88 
TWE BRITISH HONDURAS Tropical Western European 1 -4,98 -2,94 -2,95 
NA CANADA North America 24 0,76 0,45 0,04 
II CHILE Iberian Indpendent 37 3,65 1,55 1,55 
II COLOMBIA Iberian Indpendent 19 0,40 1,07 1,07 
OT COSTA RICA Other Tropical 39 4,45 3,73 3,34 
OT CUBA Other Tropical 33 2,77 2,05 2,05 
TWE DANISH VIRGIN ISLAND (b) Tropical Western European 2 -3,54 -0,28 -0,28 
OT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Other Tropical 13 -1,05 -0,85 -0,16 
TWE DUTCH ANTILLES Tropical Western European 30 1,94 1,55 0,33 
TWE DUTCH GUAYANA (Surinam) Tropical Western European 6 -2,66 -1,33 -0,66 
II ECUADOR Iberian Indpendent    34 3,00 2,27 0,41 
OT EL SALVADOR Other Tropical 41 1,57 4,21 3,61 
II FALKLANDS NonTropical European 15 -0,48 -0,22 -0,06 
TWE FRENCH GUAYANA Tropical Western European 8 -1,97 -0,77 -0,66 
TWE GRANADA (Winward Island) Tropical Western European 4 -3,03 -1,84 -0,59 
TWE GUADALUPE Tropical Western European 17 -0,15 -0,09 -0,03 
OT GUATEMALA Other Tropical 44 4,96 6,88 6,70 
OT HAITI Tropical Western European 11 -1,60 -1,43 -0,22 
OT HONDURAS Other Tropical 28 -1,44 1,22 1,14 
TWE JAMAICA Tropical Western European 3 -3,53 -2,39 -0,64 
TWE LEWARD ISLANDS Tropical Western European 21 0,50 0,34 0,12 
TWE MARTINIQUE Tropical Western European 22 0,61 0,38 0,15 
II MEXICO Iberian Indpendent 31 2,23 1,09 0,27 
NA NEW FOUNLAND North America 7 -2,22 -0,54 -0,39 
OT NICARAGUA Other Tropical 43 3,98 6,78 6,04 
II PARAGUAY Iberian Indpendent 29 1,67 1,18 0,26 
II PERU Iberian Indpendent 42 4,37 1,66 1,66 
OT PUERTO RICO Other Tropical 14 -0,63 -0,42 -0,31 
NA St. PIERRE et MIQUELON North America 9 -1,95 -0,08 -2,60 
TWE St.BARTHELEMI (b) Tropical Western European 10 -1,64 -0,55 -0,55 
TWE St.LUCIA Tropical Western European 12 -1,24 -0,82 -0,25 
TWE St.VICENTE Tropical Western European 5 -2,89 -1,49 -0,70 
TWE TRINIDAD&TOBAGO Tropical Western European 18 0,16 0,08 0,05 
TWE TURK & CAYCO ISLANDS Tropical Western European 27 1,09 0,66 0,29 
NA UNITED STATES North America 25 0,99 1,17 1,17 
2 
 
II URUGUAY Iberian Indpendent 16 -0,38 -0,08 -0,08 
II VENEZUELA Iberian Indpendent 26 1,03 -0,23 -0,23 
       
 
Southern USA 
 
 -0,46 
  
 
Nothern USA 
 
 1,61 
    Rest of the world     3,59 
  Notes: " Export pc"Export per capita at constant prices (1913$) sources see Federico-Tena (2016 b) and text. 
"B.GDPpc":  Baseline estimation of Export per capita at constant prices; "A.GDPpc"  Alternative estimation of Export 
per capita at constant prices 
(a) We compute the rate of change of the i-th series as w=- β/ψ, where β and ψ  are coefficients from a regression 
(Razzaque et al 2007) Δ Ln Wt=α+β TIME+ψ lnWt-1+ φ ln Δ Ln W t-1 +u. 
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APPENDIX
 Table 2
Export and GDP per capita levels of the Americas at 1913 US $
Export per capita (1913 $) GDP Per capita (1913 $) GDP Per capita (1913 $)
alternative estimate baseline estimate
Label Countries 1821-25 1846-50 1866-70 1821-25 1846-50 1866-70 1821-25 1846-50 1866-70
II ARGENTINA 8,2 14,4 30,7 112,6 118,8 135,1 124,6 159,6 237,0
TWE BAHAMAS 33,5 25,8 14,1 126,7 119,0 107,3 134,8 108,2 77,1
TWE BARBADOS 9,5 8,2 12,8 50,4 49,1 53,8 57,7 51,1 72,9
TWE BERMUDA 11,3 7,0 17,9 81,3 76,9 87,8 66,4 44,1 91,9
II BOLIVIA 1,1 3,4 9,4 16,5 18,8 24,8 15,0 34,0 56,6
OT BRASIL 3,2 8,9 11,4 6,7 12,5 14,9 8,4 23,6 30,1
TWE BRITISH GUAYANA 32,5 13,2 29,1 127,8 108,5 124,4 133,0 74,1 124,2
TWE BRITISH HONDURAS 121,4 69,7 13,0 147,2 95,5 38,8 219,2 185,9 73,1
NA CANADA 16,2 11,0 21,0 346,8 341,6 351,6 255,9 194,3 300,0
II CHILE 1,6 5,7 11,2 17,4 21,4 26,9 16,3 43,3 64,6
II COLOMBIA 3,3 2,6 4,4 24,7 23,9 25,8 33,4 32,5 40,4
OT COSTA RICA 1,9 14,5 19,4 6,0 18,6 23,6 13,5 79,5 97,5
OT CUBA 7,1 15,7 31,4 38,9 47,5 63,3 45,6 84,1 129,7
TWE DANISH VIRGIN ISLAND 16,9 11,5 8,2 89,1 83,7 80,5 89,0 67,0 51,5
OT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 10,2 8,0 6,8 55,9 53,7 52,5 61,1 49,8 43,9
TWE DUTCH ANTILLES 8,1 14,4 14,7 55,1 61,4 61,7 50,8 79,5 80,6
TWE DUTCH GUAYANA (Surinam) 59,6 33,4 20,2 175,8 149,6 136,4 175,9 133,6 99,9
II ECUADOR 0,8 1,7 3,2 12,1 12,9 14,4 11,8 21,2 32,9
OT EL SALVADOR 1,7 2,4 6,2 9,9 10,6 14,4 12,4 17,2 40,4
II FALKLANDS 88,0 80,2 81,2 249,9 242,1 243,2 301,3 296,3 296,8
TWE FRENCH GUAYANA 32,1 89,0 37,7 142,6 199,5 148,2 129,9 197,4 141,6
TWE GRANADA (Winward Island) 39,8 18,8 14,5 144,5 123,6 119,2 147,7 95,0 79,1
TWE GUADALUPE 24,7 22,3 29,6 104,2 101,8 109,2 112,0 106,7 125,7
OT GUATEMALA 0,1 0,7 1,7 0,4 1,1 2,0 0,9 5,4 12,2
OT HAITI 9,6 10,6 9,1 53,5 54,5 53,0 58,3 63,0 56,1
OT HONDURAS 4,6 5,2 6,6 15,6 16,1 17,5 31,2 34,6 42,7
TWE JAMAICA 27,3 17,9 10,8 110,1 100,6 93,6 120,4 92,2 64,2
TWE LEWARD ISLANDS 11,2 25,2 27,4 62,6 76,6 78,7 66,0 113,7 120,4
TWE MARTINIQUE 16,6 12,5 19,3 84,8 80,8 87,6 87,5 70,9 96,8
II MEXICO 2,1 2,1 4,9 30,4 30,4 33,2 24,8 24,5 42,5
NA NEW FOUNLAND 164,9 107,4 55,3 616,0 558,5 506,4 603,2 560,2 467,1
OT NICARAGUA 0,4 1,5 2,7 2,1 3,2 4,4 2,9 11,2 19,0
II PARAGUAY 1,4 2,0 3,3 15,3 15,9 17,2 18,6 23,9 33,8
II PERU 1,2 4,8 9,8 34,0 37,6 42,6 15,7 42,0 57,5
OT PUERTO RICO 5,4 17,5 16,6 28,5 40,6 39,7 35,9 91,1 88,0
NA St. PIERRE et MIQUELON 989,8 919,1 560,2 835,1 764,4 405,5 688,2 685,3 674,1
TWE St.BARTHELEMI 5,9 6,5 3,1 37,8 38,4 35,0 39,1 42,2 21,8
TWE St.LUCIA 20,4 14,4 15,6 95,7 89,7 90,9 100,9 77,8 83,6
TWE St.VICENTE 58,0 35,5 23,5 173,3 150,8 138,8 174,3 139,2 110,3
TWE TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 25,1 20,6 32,2 111,0 106,5 118,1 114,8 100,4 132,1
TWE TURK & CAYCO ISLANDS 21,1 14,4 21,5 94,0 87,3 94,3 103,0 75,5 101,1
NA UNITED STATES 5,5 9,3 9,0 110,5 114,3 114,0 114,8 174,6 170,9
II URUGUAY 38,7 73,5 44,3 245,3 280,1 250,9 252,6 293,3 263,3
II VENEZUELA 2,5 3,2 3,1 12,5 13,2 13,1 15,1 17,7 17,0
Sources: for Export data estimation see Federico-Tena (2016). Baseline and Alternative GDP estimation in the text
